Dr. Daniel Telech
Areas of specialization:
Ethics, Moral Psychology, Philosophy of Action
Areas of competence:
Philosophy of Mind, Post-Kantian Philosophy, Philosophy of Law
I completed a PhD in Philosophy at the University of Chicago in 2018, writing a dissertation on the nature and norms of praise, “In Praise of Praise”. I argue that philosophical thought on moral responsibility suffers from a legalistic orientation reflected in the tendency to treat blameworthiness as the model for understanding moral responsibility. By attending to individual reactive attitudes of praise (emotions like gratitude, admiration, and pride), I develop an account of responsibility in theestimability sense, which characterizes our aspirational stance towards other agents and ourselves. Before my PhD, I received a BA in Philosophy from the University of Toronto.
“Relation-Regret and Associative Luck” in Agency, Fate and Luck: Themes from Bernard Williams, eds. A. Szigeti and M. Talbert, Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
“Praise as Moral Address” Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility (vol.7), ed. D. Shoemaker, Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
“Demanding more of Strawsonian Accountability Theory” European Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming (DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12527).
“The Comparative Nonarbitrariness Norm of Blame” (with Hannah Tierney), Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 2019 (https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v16i1.654).
The Moral Psychology of Gratitude (edited, and introduction co-authored, with Robert Roberts), Rowman & Littlefield, 2019.
“Mercy at the Areopagus: A Nietzschean Account of Justice and Joy in the Eumenides” in Fatal Fictions: Crime and Investigation in Law and Literature, eds., A. LaCroix, R. McAdams, and M. Nussbaum, Oxford University Press, 2017.
“Nietzsche and Moral Psychology” in A Companion to Experimental Philosophy, eds., J. Sytsma and W. Buckwalter, Wiley-Blackwell, (with Brian Leiter), 2016.